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United States v Noriega: Conflicts between
the First Amendment and the Rights to a
Fair Trial and Privacy
Eric M. Schweikert
In United States v Noriega,' Cable News Network, Inc.
("CNN") obtained, through an undisclosed source,2 government
tapes of telephone conversations between deposed Panamanian
leader General Manuel Antonio Noriega and his attorney, Frank
Rubino. The government had recorded these conversations while
Noriega was detained at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in
Dade County, Florida ("MCC").' After obtaining the tapes, CNN
interviewed Rubino for a story to accompany their broadcast, and
allowed Rubino to review portions of the tapes." Upon learning
that the tapes contained attorney-client communications, Rubino
filed a motion to enjoin CNN from broadcasting the tapes, claim-
ing that broadcasting the tapes would jeopardize Noriega's rights
under the Sixth Amendment.
Judge William Hoeveler of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida granted Noriega's motion and
issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") barring CNN from
disseminating the tapes. Judge Hoeveler indicated that the TRO
would continue until a federal magistrate reviewed the tapes to de-
termine if their broadcast would violate Noriega's Sixth Amend-
t B.A. 1991, Fordham University; J.D. Candidate 1994, University of Chicago.
752 F Supp 1032 (S D Fla 1990), aff'd, 917 F2d 1543 (11th Cir 1990), cert denied sub
nom, Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, 498 US 976 (1990).
CNN never revealed its source, and much conjecture surrounds the identity of this
source. See Spencer Reiss, Eavesdropping on Noriega, Newsweek 60 (Nov 19, 1990). One
commentator suggests that the government may have intentionally leaked the information
in an effort to abort the Noriega trial and avoid the admission of evidence that would em-
barrass the government. See Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.05[c]
at 193 n 20 (Matthew.Bender, Supp 1992) ("Nimmer Treatise").
Noriega was awaiting federal charges for participating in an international conspiracy
to import -cocaine and materials used in producing cocaine into the United States. See
United States v Noriega, 683 F Supp 1373 (S D Fla 1988).
4 See United States v Noriega, 917 F2d at 1546 n 4.
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ment right to a fair trial.5 The Eleventh Circuit upheld Judge
Hoeveler's ruling,6 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Noriega marks the first time that an appellate court upheld an
order preventing the press from publishing information that could
compromise a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
fair trial." Although the court's decision to prevent the press from
disseminating information in its possession constituted a prior re-
straint, the "most serious and least tolerable" infringement on
First Amendment rights, 9 allowing CNN to broadcast the tapes in
this case would have jeopardized Noriega's Sixth Amendment right
to a fair and impartial jury and his right to be free from the dis-
closure of his trial strategy to the prosecution. 10 Furthermore,
CNN's broadcast of the tapes would have threatened Noriega's
right to privacy in telephone conversations, guaranteed under fed-
eral law by Title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title III")." This striking conflict be-
tween the First Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, and the right
to privacy increases existing tensions between law enforcement
agencies, the press, and criminal suspects, and demands a reasoned
response from the judicial system.
This Comment argues that Judge Hoeveler and the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals erred in granting the TRO because
Noriega did not make the showing required under established
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. This Comment recognizes that
the court could nonetheless have granted injunctive relief under
Title III to protect Noriega's privacy interest in telephone conver-
sations, a restraint which this Comment argues would pass consti-
tutional muster. The Comment suggests, however, that courts
should not issue such prior restraints to protect a criminal defend-
5 Noriega, 752 F Supp at 1032.
6 United States v Noriega, 917 F2d at 1543.
Cable News Network, Inc. v Noriega, 498 US at 976.
8 See Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v District Ct, 729 F2d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir
1983) ("[F]ederal and state appellate courts have held without exception that trial court
restraints on the reporting of judicial proceedings failed to meet the requirements [for a
prior restraint]."). Before Noriega, the courts had not contradicted this statement.
' Nebraska Press Association v Stuart, 427 US 539, 559 (1976). See also Near v Minne-
sota, 283 US 697, 713 (1931) (the "chief purpose" of the First Amendment is to prevent
prior restraints).
10 The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defense." US Const, Amend VI. See Part II for a discussion of the
right to a fair and impartial jury and the right to be free from the disclosure of trial strategy
to the prosecution.
" Pub L No 90-351, 82 Stat 212 (1968), codified at 18 USC §§ 2510-2520 (1988).
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ant's privacy rights because such restraints may encourage, rather
than deter, the press from broadcasting this material.
Part I of the Comment sets forth the holdings of the Noriega
decisions. Part II criticizes these holdings and concludes that
Noriega failed to make the required showing that CNN's broadcast
of the tapes would prejudice his Sixth Amendment rights. Part III
describes the circumstances under which the government recorded
Noriega's attorney-client conversations and applies Title III to
those facts. Part IV concludes that although Title III allows the
imposition of a prior restraint, granting such restraints under Title
III may create incentives for the press to violate the very Sixth
Amendment privacy rights which Title III seeks to protect. The
Comment thus concludes that even where constitutionally justi-
fied, courts should not use prior restraints to prevent the press
from broadcasting private information about a criminal defendant.
I. THE NORIEGA CASE
A. District Court Decision
Noriega's defense counsel filed its motion for injunctive relief
on November 7, 1990. On the next day, Judge Hoeveler granted
Noriega a TRO,12 noting that if CNN published Noriega's attor-
ney-client communications, the court could find itself unable to
fulfill its Sixth Amendment duty to impanel a fair and impartial
jury.13 Furthermore, Judge Hoeveler stated that CNN's broadcast
of the tapes could disclose Noriega's trial strategy and protected
confidences to the prosecution, thus further violating Noriega's
Sixth Amendment rights."'
Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that preventing CNN
from broadcasting the information would constitute a prior re-
straint. 5 While Judge Hoeveler found that prior restraints are
"presumptively unconstitutional,"'" and that the movant thus
bears a "heavy burden" to show that the restraint is justified, 7 he
also noted that in Nebraska Press Association v Stuart,, the Su-
Noriega, 752 F Supp at 1032.
" Id at 1033.
' Id at 1034.
lB Id at 1033.
' 752 F Supp at 1033. See also New York Times Co. v United States, 403 US 713, 714
(1971).
11 752 F Supp at 1033, quoting Organization for a Better Austin v Keefe, 402 US 415,
419 (1971).
18 427 US at 539.
3691
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preme Court indicated that cases involving a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial were within "the very narrow range
of cases which may justify a restraint.""9
In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court promulgated a strin-
gent three-part test to determine the constitutionality of prior re-
straints that attempt to prevent prejudicial pretrial publicity. The
Court held that such restraints are valid only where: (1) the nature
and extent of the pretrial publicity would impair the right to a fair
trial; (2) no less restrictive alternatives would mitigate the effect of
the publicity; and (3) a prior restraint would effectively prevent
the harm.20 Although Nebraska Press addressed only the prejudi-
cial effect of pretrial publicity on the right to a fair and impartial
jury, Judge Hoeveler stated that the "three-prong test in Nebraska
Press . . .applies as well where the disclosure of the defense and
confidential trial strategy is at stake."'"
The Nebraska Press test, as construed by Judge Hoeveler, re-
quires "factual findings based on the content of the speech at is-
sue."22 Judge Hoeveler concluded that the court could not make
these findings unless it reviewed the tapes in CNN's possession.23
Judge Hoeveler therefore ordered that the TRO continue until
CNN produced the tapes and a federal magistrate reviewed them
for prejudicial material.2 4
B. Eleventh Circuit Decision
Upon CNN's petition for an "emergency appeal," the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed Judge Hoeveler's decision on November 10, 1990.25
In its decision, the court stated that when confronted with a con-
flict between First and Sixth Amendment rights, the "primary re-
sponsibility" of the district court is to ensure the defendant's right
19 752 F Supp at 1033-34, citing Nebraska Press, 427 US at 539.
20 See Noriega, 752 F Supp at 1034, citing Nebraska Press, 427 US at 562-68.
a' 752 F Supp at 1034.
22 Id. Appellate courts have not hesitated to overrule prior restraints on the basis that
the trial judge failed to make adequate factual findings. See, for example, United States v
McKenzie, 697 F2d 1225, 1227 (5th Cir 1983) (overturning an order consisting of "one sen-
tence . . . not supported by any findings whatsoever"); Matter of Providence Journal Co.,
820 F2d 1342, 1351 (1st Cir 1986) (characterizing the district court's failure to make factual
findings as "an omission making the invalidity of the order even more transparent").
" United States v Noriega, 752 F Supp 1045, 1049 n 3 (S D Fla).
Judge Hoeveler agreed with Noriega's objection that direct review of the tapes by the
judge could lead to his recusal because he would be exposed to the defense's trial strategy.
Thus, the court appointed a magistrate to conduct the review. 752 F Supp at 1034-35.
25 Noriega, 917 F2d at 1543.
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to a fair trial,26 a process over which the trial judge retains "broad
discretion. 2 7 In light of this "affirmative constitutional duty to
minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity," the Eleventh
Circuit found that the trial judge "may surely take protective mea-
sures even when they are not strictly and inescapably necessary."26
The Eleventh Circuit, however, rather than adopting the Ne-
braska Press test, applied Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court
of California29 to the facts in Noriega. In Press-Enterprise, the
Supreme Court held that a court may close a preliminary hearing
to the press only if the court specifically finds that: (1) there is a
substantial probability that publicity will prejudice the defendant's
right to a fair trial; (2) there is a substantial probability that clo-
sure would prevent the prejudice; and (3) reasonable alternatives
to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial
rights.30 The Press-Enterprise test, although closely resembling
the Nebraska Press test, requires only a "substantial probability"
of harm and a finding that no "reasonable alternatives" exist.3 " In
contrast, courts have construed Nebraska Press to require that the
publicity will impair the right to a fair trial and that no less re-
strictive alternatives to a prior restraint exist.32
Applying this test, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district
court could preclude CNN from broadcasting the tapes if it made
the factual findings required by Press-Enterprise.s3 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit continued the TRO until the district court re-
viewed the tapes. 4
C. Supreme Court Decision
On November 18, 1990, the Supreme Court, by a 7-2 vote and
without opinion, denied CNN's petition for certiorari and its mo-
tion to stay the district court order.3 5 Justice Marshall, joined by
" Id at 1547.
"7 Id at 1548.
18 Id at 1549, citing Gannett Co. v DePasquale, 443 US 368, 378 (1977).
29 478 US 1 (1986).
80 Id at 14, cited in Noriega, 917 F2d at 1549.
478 US at 14.
32 See Noriega, 752 F Supp at 1035, citing Nebraska Press, 427 US at 562-69. See also
Providence Journal Co., 820 F2d at 1351 ("As the Supreme Court made clear in Nebraska
Press Association, a party seeking a prior restraint against the press must show not only
that publication will result in damage to a near sacred right, but also that the prior restraint
will be effective and that no less extreme measures are available.").
" 917 F2d at 1550.
34 Id.
'5 Cable News Network, 498 US at 976.
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Justice O'Connor, filed a dissenting opinion. 6 Noting the "heavy
presumption" against the constitutional validity of a prior re-
straint and the "heavy burden" on the movant to show justifica-
tion for the restraint, Justice Marshall, citing such cases as Ne-
braska Press and New York Times Co. v United States,
7
concluded: "I do not see how the prior restraint in this case can be
reconciled with these teachings."8
D. Decision on Remand
CNN produced the tapes two days after the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari.8 9 After reviewing the tapes,4 0 Judge Hoeveler
found that the tapes contained no material that could prejudice
Noriega's Sixth Amendment rights to the extent required by Ne-
braska Press."' The court thus lifted the TRO and returned the
tapes to CNN. 2
II. CRITICISM OF THE NORIEGA DECISION
For three reasons, the district court and the Eleventh Circuit
erred in ruling against CNN. First, Judge Hoeveler, without re-
viewing the tapes, could have made the factual findings necessary
to establish that CNN's broadcast of the tapes would not taint the
jury pool to the extent required by Nebraska Press. Second, Judge
Hoeveler erred in failing to require that Noriega meet the burden
established in Nebraska Press with regard to the violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to be free from disclosure of trial strategy.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit erred in applying the Press-Enter-
prise test rather than the more stringent standard for prior re-
straints demanded by Nebraska Press.
A. District Court: Nebraska Press and a Fair and Impartial Jury
In order to meet the strict standard articulated in Nebraska
Press, a trial judge must find that "further publicity, unchecked,
would so distort the views of potential jurors that twelve could not
be found who could, under proper instructions, fulfill their sworn
"6 Id at 976-77 (Marshall dissenting).
" 403 US at 713.
"8 Cable News Network, 498 US at 976-77 (Marshall dissenting).
" Noriega, 752 F Supp at 1048.
" Initially, a federal magistrate reviewed the tapes. Judge Hoeveler also reviewed them
after Noriega dropped his objection to such review. Id at 1048 n 1.
41 Id at 1052-54.
11 Id at 1054.
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duty to render a just verdict exclusively on the evidence presented
in open court." '43 Because Noriega's trial took place in a large met-
ropolitan area, however, CNN's broadcast of the information it
possessed would not have had this prejudicial effect, indicating
that the district court's order was therefore invalid.
Lower courts have recognized that in "heterogeneous metro-
politan areas," it is "extremely unlikely that [pre-trial publicity]
will produce the community-wide prejudice required by Nebraska
Press."" The Southern District of Florida, the forum for Noriega's
criminal trial, includes the Miami metropolitan area which, accord-
ing to 1990 census statistics, has a population in excess of 3.1 mil-
lion people.45 Even had the tapes contained prejudicial informa-
tion, their broadcast would not likely have reached a jury pool
potentially exceeding 1 million people and prejudiced their views
to the extent that twelve jurors could not have been found to
render a just verdict. Furthermore, even if the broadcast of the
tapes did create such community-wide prejudice, "other alterna-
tives" under the third part of the Nebraska Press test, such as
change of venue, could have guaranteed Noriega a fair trial. Judge
Hoeveler could have made these findings without reviewing CNN's
tapes; thus, he could not legitimately justify the order to produce
on those grounds.
B. District Court: Nebraska Press and the Disclosure of Trial
Strategy
In order to evaluate Noriega's claim that CNN's broadcast of
the tapes would violate his right to be free from the disclosure of
" Nebraska Press, 427 US at 569. The Supreme Court has recognized that excessive
pre-trial publicity may impair a criminal defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury. See
Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 US 333 (1966); Estes v Texas, 381 US 532 (1965); Rideau v Loui-
siana, 373 US 723 (1963); Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717 (1961); Patterson v Colorado, 205 US
454 (1907).
"' Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v District Ct, 729 F2d at 1182 (reversing a
district court order temporarily restraining CBS from publishing government surveillance
tapes generated in the investigation and prosecution of John Z. DeLorean). See also In re
CBS, Inc., 570 F Supp 578 (E D La 1983), where the court held invalid under the First
Amendment an order requiring CBS to produce tapes of a 60 Minutes segment so that the
court could evaluate the possible prejudicial effect of the broadcast of the segment on the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury. The court found that only
17 percent of the 3.6 million residents of Dallas, the forum for the criminal trial, regularly
watched 60 Minutes, and that there was "no doubt that 12 impartial jurors could be found
from the remaining 'large' Dallas juror-qualifying population who would not have viewed
• . . [the relevant] segment." Id at 583.
" United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992
31 (112th ed 1992).
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trial strategy, 6 it is first necessary to determine whether the
press's right to be free from prior restraints encompasses the
broadcast of privileged attorney-client conversations. The rationale
underlying the attorney-client privilege suggests that First Amend-
ment protection should indeed apply.
The attorney-client privilege provides that in order to foster
candid communication between an attorney and client, such privi-
leged communications shall not be admissible in court.47 CNN's
broadcast of the tapes, however, would not have made their con-
tents admissible as evidence, and thus would not have frustrated
this underlying goal of the attorney-client privilege.
More generally, the attorney-client privilege promotes free
communications between an attorney and client by protecting the
confidentiality of these communications. 48 Judge Hoeveler, how-
ever, correctly noted that Noriega's conversations lost their confi-
dentiality when the government taped them, making the imposi-
tion of a prior restraint to protect this interest merely "symbolic
and prophylactic."' 9 Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not
affect CNN's ability to broadcast the tapes to the general public,
but does prevent the disclosure of trial strategy to the prosecu-
tion,50 a violation properly evaluated under Nebraska Press.
Even under this analysis, there is a strong argument that the
TRO met the stringent three-part standard of Nebraska Press.
First, disclosure of any trial strategy contained in the tapes would
certainly have prejudiced Noriega's Sixth Amendment rights if it
had reached the prosecution. Second, the conversations, in order to
create the required prejudicial effect, need only have reached one
member of the prosecution team, rather than taint a large jury
40 The Sixth Amendment protects an attorney-client communication from disclosure to
the prosecution where it is "intended to remain confidential and was made under such cir-
cumstances that it was reasonably expected and understood to be confidential." United
States v Melvin, 650 F2d 641, 645 (5th Cir 1981), citing Edward W. Cleary, ed, McCormick's
Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 91 (West Publishing Co., 2d ed 1972).
17 McCormick on Evidence § 87 at 314 (West Publishing Co., 4th ed 1992).
"8 Id at 313-17.
" Noriega, 752 F Supp at 1033.
"0 Judge Hoeveler himself recognized this distinction:
A secondary purpose behind the attorney-client privilege, and the prohibition of
its violation, is to prevent the disclosure of information damaging to the defend-
ant's case-information which, though damaging, is privileged. In this sense, the
issue is really one of the right to a fair trial rather than the attorney-client privi-
lege per se.
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pool. Third, no less restrictive alternative existed,"' and a prior re-
straint would effectively have prevented the harm to Noriega.
Instead of applying the Nebraska Press test, however, Judge
Hoeveler simply ordered CNN to produce the tapes for review and
refrain from broadcasting them until the review was completed.
While requiring CNN to turn over the tapes did not, in itself, con-
stitute a prior restraint, because CNN simply could have produced
a copy of the tapes and kept the originals,52 the order to refrain
from broadcasting the tapes did constitute a prior restraint, be-
cause it prevented CNN from disseminating information in its pos-
session. Thus, the validity of the restraining order should be ana-
lyzed under Nebraska Press.
The fact that Judge Hoeveler ordered that the TRO should
remain in place only as long as it took the court to review the tapes
in CNN's possession does not change the analysis under Nebraska
Press. The Nebraska Press Court itself stated that "the burden on
the [movant] is not reduced by the temporary nature of a re-
straint.""8 The restraint, therefore, albeit short-lived, still must
meet the stringent requirements of Nebraska Press.
Instead of applying Nebraska Press, however, Judge Hoeveler
relied on principles of "fundamental fairness" to justify the TRO.
Although noting that a showing of "clear, immediate, and irrepara-
ble danger to Defendant's right to a fair trial" is necessary before a
prior restraint will issue,54 Judge Hoeveler found that it would be
"fundamentally unfair" to allow CNN to broadcast the tapes sim-
ply because it would not turn them over to the court to make the
necessary factual inquiry.5 5 To do so would "allow CNN to argue
that no prior restraint should issue because no clear and immedi-
ate harm is apparent when the only reason that no clear and im-
mediate harm yet appears is because CNN has so far prevented
Although sequestering the prosecution team may have been an alternative to a prior
restraint, Judge Hoeveler noted that it was not a viable alternative because it "can be ex-
pected to require at least a few days to put in place." Noriega, 752 F Supp at 1049 n 2.
" See Nimmer Treatise § 4-28 at 190 (cited in note 2) (noting that CNN had no propri-
etary interest in the tapes because the tapes themselves belonged to the government, while
any proprietary interest in the attorney-client conversations belonged to Noriega).
'3 Nebraska Press, 427 US at 559.
" Noriega, 752 F Supp at 1035. See also New York Times, 403 US at 730 (Stewart
concurring) ("direct, immediate, and irreparable damage" is necessary to justify a prior re-
straint); 403 US at 726-27 (Brennan concurring) ("only governmental allegation and proof
that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event
[justifying a prior restraint] can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order").
11 752 F Supp at 1035.
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this court from reviewing the content of the tapes in its
possession."56
Judge Hoeveler's conception of "fundamental fairness" contra-
dicts established prior restraint jurisprudence. Generally, a TRO
may issue only to protect the status quo. 57 In a prior restraint case,
the status quo protects the press's First Amendment right to pub-
lish information in its possession at any time it chooses, unless the
movant meets the heavy burden articulated in New York Times
*and Nebraska Press.5 8 A prior restraint therefore "disturbs the sta-
tus quo and impinges on the exercise of editorial discretion."5 The
stringent Nebraska Press test protects this status quo and the es-
sential First Amendment right to remain free from prior restraints.
Courts have recognized that the right to be free from prior re-
straints is a fundamental First Amendment right because prior re-
straints present problems that are not posed by post-publication
punishment. First, a prior restraint prohibits speech before it is
spoken. Thus, while post-publication punishment "chills" speech, a
prior restraint "freezes" it for the duration of the injunction. Sec-
ond, the "collateral bar" rule prevents the enjoined party from
challenging the constitutionality of the injunction in a contempt
proceeding.6 That party thus faces a "trilemma of chilling effects":
(1) it may comply with the injunction and accept the suppression
of its speech; (2) it may appeal the order directly, but obey the
restraint in the interim; or (3) it may ignore the injunction but
thus lose its right to challenge the constitutionality of the order.2
Courts, in promulgating such stringent tests as that in Nebraska
Press, have properly recognized that the press deserves a high de-
gree of protection from this unique chilling effect.
Judge Hoeveler, therefore, should not have used his concep-
tion of "fundamental fairness" to eviscerate the protections pro-
vided by Nebraska Press. Indeed, Judge Hoeveler's approach
amounts to a system of judicial censorship that restrains the press
whenever it has exclusive possession of material which a defendant
alleges may prejudice his Sixth Amendment rights. Although strict
" Id.
17 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 US 425, 439 (1974).
68 See Nimmer Treatise § 4-28 at 191 (cited in note 2).
6' Providence Journal, 820 F2d at 1351.
60 Nebraska Press, 427 US at 559, citing Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent
61 (Yale University Press, 1975).
"1 See Walker v City of Birmingham, 388 US 307, 321 (1967) (applying collateral bar
rule to freedom of expression cases).
62 Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 Stan L Rev 539, 553 (1977).
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enforcement of the Nebraska Press test where the press is the sole
possessor of the material at issue may make it difficult for the mo-
vant to meet the required burden,6e CNN should not be denied its
fundamental right to be free from prior restraints simply because
its information was unavailable from other sources.
Although denying prior restraints to defendants in this situa-
tion may lead to an occasional publication that violates a defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment rights, Judge Hoeveler's proposed system
would result in recurring violations of the press's fundamental
First Amendment right to be free from prior restraints. The use of
prior restraints to protect Sixth Amendment rights should thus be
limited to those situations in which the moving party fulfills the
heavy burden enunciated in Nebraska Press.
C. Eleventh Circuit: Press-Enterprise and Nebraska Press
The Eleventh Circuit's decision was based on two erroneous
assumptions. First, the court's initial premise that the "primary re-
sponsibility" of the district court is to protect the criminal defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment rights at the expense of the press's First
Amendment rights is incorrect. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the "authors of the Bill of Rights did not under-
take to assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth
Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the other. ' '" Al-
though rejecting the position that First Amendment rights always
take precedence over a criminal defendant's right to be free from
prejudicial publicity, the Nebraska Press Court found it "clear
that the barriers to prior restraint remain high unless we are to
abandon what the Court has said for nearly a quarter of our na-
tional existence and implied throughout all of it."' "
Second, the Eleventh Circuit erred in applying the Press-En-
terprise test. Press-Enterprise governs the press's limited First
" FRCP 65(b) states, in pertinent part:
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to
the adverse party or his attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts
shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or his
attorney can be heard in opposition . ...
FRCP 65(b). Thus, Noriega could have obtained an ex parte TRO had he been able to
identify in an affidavit particular conversations on the CNN tapes that would violate his
Sixth Amendment rights. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Noriega or his attorney
remembered the contents of all of their conversations during Noriega's stay at the MCC,
making this burden quite difficult to fulfill.
" Nebraska Press, 427 US at 561.
66 Id.
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Amendment right of access to court documents and proceedings. 6
Noriega, however, did not involve the closure of court documents
or proceedings, but instead addressed a prior restraint against in-
formation already in the press's possession. Indeed, Justice Ste-
vens, dissenting on other grounds in Press-Enterprise, recognized
that the press is entitled to a higher degree of protection if the
information is already in its possession,67 a position that many
lower courts have followed."
While commentators have debated the validity of this distinc-
tion between access and prior restraint, 9 it remains a settled prin-
ciple of law that the Nebraska Press and Press-Enterprise tests
are not interchangeable. While Press-Enterprise allows a court to
deny access upon a showing of a "substantial probability" of harm,
the imposition of a prior restraint requires a showing of "clear, im-
mediate, and irreparable" harm.70 Furthermore, Press-Enterprise
requires only a showing that "reasonable alternatives" do not exist,
while a prior restraint requires a court to determine whether any
means short of a restraining order would prevent the harm.1
Therefore, courts addressing prior restraints cannot rely on Press-
Enterprise, but instead must apply the more stringent Nebraska
Press test.
" 478 US at 14.
7 Justice Stevens argued:
[I]t bears emphasis that the First Amendment right asserted by petitioner is not a
right to publish or otherwise communicate information lawfully or unlawfully ac-
* quired. That right. . . may be overcome only by a governmental objective of the
highest order attainable in a no less intrusive way. The First Amendment right
asserted by petitioner in this case, in contrast, is not the right to publicize infor-
mation in its possession, but the right to acquire access thereto.
Id at 17-18 (Stevens dissenting) (citations omitted).
" See United States v Klepfer, 734 F2d 93, 96 (2d Cir 1984) ("This is not a case of
prior restraint; the issue concerns access to information."); Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette v
Baker, 788 F Supp 379, 383 (N D Ind 1992) ("[T]he right to publish or otherwise communi-
cate information lawfully or unlawfully acquired, is accorded more protection than . . . the
right to acquire access to information.") (internal quotations omitted).
" Compare Bickel, The Morality of Consent at 79-82 (cited in note 60) (stating that
the government's right to keep material confidential would be overpowering if it included
the right to prevent the dissemination of that material once it fell into the hands of the
press), with Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 Cal L Rev 889, 902-
904 (1986) (criticizing Bickel's approach and concluding that "[t]he sharp distinction be-
tween rights of access and rights of publication . . . rests on unstable foundations").
70 See note 60 and accompanying text.
" Nebraska Press, 427 US at 563.
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III. TITLE III AND NORIEGA
Title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 ("Title III")72 governs the interception, use,
and disclosure of wiretap information obtained in a criminal inves-
tigation.73 Title III, although not addressed in any of the Noriega
opinions, has strong implications for any case, such as Noriega,
which involves wiretaps.
A. The Interception of Noriega's Conversations
The MCC, for security reasons, automatically recorded all in-
mate calls made from the institution, with the exception of "prop-
erly placed calls to an attorney. ' 74 Due to the nature of the system
used to record these calls, unmonitored calls could only be made
from staff telephones rather than inmate telephones.7 5
Because of Noriega's special status as a controversial and well-
known figure, the government installed a personal telephone
outside of his cell.76 A label on this telephone advised Noriega that
all calls, with the exception of "properly placed" calls to an attor-
ney would be recorded,7 and Noriega signed a consent form to this
effect.78 Nonetheless, Judge Hoeveler found that MCC personnel
did not adequately inform Noriega that a "properly placed call to
an attorney" must be made from a staff telephone, and Noriega,
although informing the MCC staff when he was calling his attor-
ney, made all calls to his attorney from his personal telephone.7
These calls were automatically recorded.80
B. Application of Title III to Noriega
After Judge Hoeveler returned the tapes of Noriega's conver-
sations to CNN, Noriega moved to dismiss his indictment on the
grounds that the government's taping of his attorney-client conver-
sations violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that
the taping of his conversations with other parties violated Title
72 18 USC §§ 2510-2520 (1988).
11 See 18 USC § 2511(1) (1988).
71 United States v Noriega, 764 F Supp 1480, 1482 (S D Fla 1991).
" Id at 1483.
76 Id.
7 Id.
76 764 F Supp at 1485.
71 Id at 1485-86.
60 Id.
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III." In denying this motion, Judge Hoeveler ruled that the taping
of Noriega's conversations with parties other than his attorney fell
under two exceptions to the broad prohibition against non-author-
ized wiretapping in Title III: (1) the interception by "an investiga-
tive or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his du-
ties; ' 82 and (2) the situation in which "one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception."83
Judge Hoeveler's opinion, however, suggests that the govern-
ment indeed violated Title III in intercepting Noriega's attorney-
client conversations. Although holding that the attorney-client
conversations at issue did not create the requisite prejudice for a
Sixth Amendment violation,84 Judge Hoeveler found that Noriega
was not "sufficiently informed of the procedures for making an un-
monitored, unrecorded [attorney-client] call so as [to] make any
expectation of privacy unreasonable."8 Noriega thus had a "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" in these conversations and did not
truly consent to their interception.
Furthermore, contrary to Judge Hoeveler's assertion, the in-
terception of attorney-client conversations was not within the "or-
dinary course of duty" of prison officials. Judge Hoeveler held that
the interception of the third-party conversations was in the ordi-
nary course of duty because it was "based on legitimate security
considerations" reflected in "MCC's established [interception] pol-
icy."8 MCC policy, however, explicitly prohibited the recording of
properly placed attorney-client conversations.8 Thus, because
MCC failed to adequately notify Noriega of the proper procedure
for placing a unrecorded call,88 the interception of Noriega's attor-
ney-client conversations was not within the ordinary course of
prison officials' duties. Thus, these conversations were intercepted
in violation of Title III.
IV. TITLE III AND PRIOR RESTRAINTS
Some scholars suggest that a prior restraint may be justified
where the press acquires information with knowledge that the sup-
' Id at 1480.
82 764 F Supp at 1490, citing 18 USC § 2510(5)(a)(ii) (1988).
Id at 1491, citing 18 USC § 2511(2)(c) (1988).
Id at 1489.
Id at 1487.
764 F Supp at 1491.
8' Id at 1482.
88 Id at 1486.
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plier of the information obtained the information unlawfully.""
Furthermore, courts have held that a prior restraint may be valid
where the press's disclosure of information would violate a statute
providing for injunctive relief that protects interests that justify a
prior restraint."
As discussed in Part III, the government's taping of Noriega's
attorney-client conversations violated Title III. This raises two
possible grounds for restraining CNN from publishing the mate-
rial. First, CNN may have obtained the material with knowledge
that the government made the tapes unlawfully. Second, Title III's
provision for injunctive relief may apply to CNN's disclosure of the
tapes, and may protect interests that justify a prior restraint.
A. Prior Restraints and Unlawfully Obtained Information
Title III expressly prohibits law enforcement officials from dis-
closing wiretaps obtained in violation of its provisions. 1 Although
this amounts to a prior restraint against the law enforcement offi-
cial, commentary and Supreme Court precedent suggest that such
a restraint is constitutionally permissible.9 2 The settled constitu-
tionality of this restraint against a government official suggests
8' See Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of Expres-
sion in the Burger Court, 94 Harv L Rev 1, 11 (1980). In New York Times Co. v United
States, Justice Harlan suggested that the Court determine "[w]hether the newspapers are
entitled to retain and use the documents notwithstanding the seemingly uncontested facts
that the documents, or the originals of which they are duplicates, were purloined from the
Government's possession and that the newspapers received them with knowledge that they
had been feloniously acquired." 403 US at 754 (Harlan dissenting).
90 See notes 102-03 and accompanying text. In United States v Progressive, Inc., 467 F
Supp 990 (W D Wis 1979), the district court held that publication of an article that de-
scribed the procedure for making an atomic bomb could be enjoined under the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1954, 42 USC §§ 2011 et seq (1954). The court found that the injunctive provi-
sions of 42 USC §§ 2274(b) and 2280 applied to the article at issue, and that the threat to
national security justified a prior restraint. 467 F Supp at 993.
"1 Title III allows for disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications by law en-
forcement officials only where such communications are obtained "by any means authorized
by this chapter." 18 USC §§ 2517(1)-(2) (1988). Noriega's attorney-client conversations were
obtained in violation of Title III, and their disclosure would thus be prohibited under the
statute.
" See Dan B. Dobbs, 2 Law of Remedies § 7.3(5) at 327 (West Publishing Co., 2d ed
1993) ("[W]hen the information being published is obtained by improper means such as
theft or trespass, or is obtained properly but in a fiduciary or confidential relationship, the
injunction is quite proper, even though it stops publication."); Snepp v United States, 444
US 507 (1980) (former CIA agent who breaches an employment contract by publishing in-
formation without agency clearance may be enjoined to submit future writings for prepubli-
cation clearance).
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that the press could legitimately be restrained as the knowing re-
cipient of such unlawfully obtained information.9
In order to succeed in this argument, however, the movant
must show that the press had knowledge that its source obtained
the information unlawfully.14 In Noriega, CNN did have reason to
know that the tapes of Noriega's attorney-client conversations
were made in violation of Title III. In fact, CNN claimed that the
tapes were newsworthy precisely because they revealed that the
government had unlawfully recorded Noriega's conversations. 5
Case law suggests that the First Amendment does not allow
the imposition of a prior restraint to prevent the disclosure of in-
formation when the press has reason to know that its source ob-
tained the information unlawfully. In Landmark Communications,
Inc. v Virginia,96 for example, the Supreme Court examined a Vir-
ginia statute that provided criminal sanctions for the disclosure of
information regarding confidential proceedings in a judicial mis-
conduct investigation. The Court held that such punishment of a
newspaper's publication of truthful information regarding the pro-
ceedings violated the newspaper's rights under the First Amend-
ment. 8 Although the Court did not challenge the state's ability to
keep the proceedings confidential," it nonetheless found that this
power did not entitle the government to restrain true information
obtained in violation of the confidentiality provision. 100
Like CNN, the newspaper in Landmark had reason to know
that its source acted in violation of a valid statute. 101 Nonetheless,
the Landmark Court held that the First Amendment protects dis-
closure of information obtained in this manner from post-publica-
tion punishment, a lesser sanction than a prior restraint.
" See note 91 and accompanying text.
04 See Cox, 94 Harv L'Rev at 11 (cited in note 89) (noting that this argument is strong-
est where the recipient induced the violation, weaker where the publisher was a passive
recipient, and probably untenable if the publisher was ignorant of the violation).
" See CNN's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No 90-767 at 8-9 (Nov 15, 1990), in
LEXIS (Genfed library, Briefs file).
435 US 829 (1978).
97 Id at%831.
98 Id at 838.
Id at 841.
100 The Landmark Court rested much of its holding on the fact that the speech at issue
related to the conduct of a government official, speech that "lies near the core of the First
Amendment." 435 US at 838. Nonetheless, the Court did not indicate that other speech
would be entitled to less protection.
101 See id at 832 (noting that the newspaper's managing editor knew that it was a mis-
demeanor for anyone participating in the proceedings to divulge information about those
proceedings).
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Landmark indicates, therefore, that a prior restraint preventing
CNN from publishing the information in its possession would vio-
late the First Amendment, even if CNN knew that its source had
violated Title III.
B. Title III as the Basis for a Prior Restraint
The Supreme Court has been unwilling to order a prior re-
straint absent a statute specifically providing for injunctive re-
lief.101 Even if a statute provides injunctive relief, a prior restraint
will not pass constitutional muster unless the statute protects one
of the few interests that justify this relief.1 03 Thus, two inquiries
must be made under Title III: (1) whether the statute provides in-
junctive relief to prevent the disclosure of unlawfully recorded con-
versations; and (2) whether Title III protects interests that justify
a prior restraint.
1. Injunctive relief under Title III.
Section 2520(a) of Title III provides that "any person whose
wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action
recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation
such relief as may be appropriate."''1 4 "Appropriate relief" includes
"such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may
be appropriate."' 1 5 Any person who "intentionally discloses, or en-
deavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to
know that the information was obtained through the interception
of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this sub-
section" violates Title 111.106
CNN's actions fall within Title III's provisions for injunctive
relief because CNN "endeavor[ed] to disclose" the tapes of
Noriega's attorney-client conversations: CNN manifested the in-
tent to broadcast the tapes when it asked-Rubino for his comments
101 See New York Times, 403 US at 718 (Black concurring); 403 US at 730 (Douglas
concurring); 403 US at 730 (Stewart concurring); 403 US at 740 (White concurring); 403 US
at 745 (Marshall concurring).
'03 See Providence Journal, 820 F2d at 1349 n 51 ("Even if Congress had authorized
the issuance of a prior restraint under ... Title III, a court could issue such an order only if
the restraint met the standards articulated by the Supreme Court. Obviously, Congress can-
not abrogate by statute the protection accorded the press under the First Amendment.").
"' 18 USC § 2520(a) (1988).
105 18 USC § 2520(b)(1) (1988).
106 18 USC § 2511(1)(c) (1988).
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on the tape. Moreover, CNN had reason to know that the tapes
were obtained in violation of Title III because its primary interest
in broadcasting the tapes was to show that the government had
unlawfully recorded Noriega's attorney-client conversations. 07
Thus, Title III provides Noriega with an injunctive remedy against
CNN.
The Supreme Court, however, has held that as a condition to
statutory injunctive relief, the movant must show that he would be
entitled to an injunction under general principles of equity.108
Noriega would meet this requirement because Title III protects
privacy interests that, under equitable principles, justify injunctive
relief. Indeed, the legislative history of Title III indicates that a
main purpose of the statute was to "protect[ ] the privacy of wire
and oral communications.' 1 9 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
noted that "the protection of privacy was an overriding congres-
sional concern" in the passage of Title III.1'
These privacy interests meet the standards that equity re-
quires for injunctive relief. Traditionally, a preliminary injunction
will not issue absent a showing of "irreparable harm." ' Violations
of privacy rights inherently cause irreparable harm, because "such
rights are often truly irreplaceable.""' 2 Thus, CNN's "clear, imme-
diate, and irreparable" threat to Noriega's privacy rights justifies
the imposition of a TRO.
2. Privacy interests and prior restraints.
Two courts have held that the privacy interests protected by
Title III do not justify a prior restraint in light of the press's com-
peting First Amendment rights. In Matter of Providence Journal
Co.,"' the First Circuit stated in dicta that Title III would not
support a prior restraint' 1 4 because "publication [that] would
'1o CNN's Petition For Writ of Certiorari, No 90-767 at 8-9 (cited in note 95).
108 Hecht Co. v Bowles, 321 US 321, 329-30 (1944); Rondeau v Mosinee Paper Co., 422
US 49, 61 (1975).
109 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1967, S Rep No 1097, 90th Cong, 2d
Sess 66 (1968).
110 Gelbard v United States, 408 US 41, 48 (1972).
"I Rondeau, 422 US at 61. Although courts have deemphasized the importance of ir-
reparable harm in recent permanent injunction cases, it remains significant in cases involv-
ing preliminary relief. Dobbs, 2 Law of Remedies § 2.11(2) at 253 (cited in note 92).
112 Dobbs, 2 Law of Remedies § 2.11(1) at 252 (cited in note 92).
113 820 F2d at 1342.
... The Providence Journal court did not reach the issue of whether Title III justified a
prior restraint because it found that the statute did not provide injunctive relief. See id at
1349. Providence Journal, however, was argued on September 11, 1986, and decided Decem-
ber 31, 1986. Congress enacted the injunctive remedy of Section 2520(b)(1) on October 21,
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prove embarrassing or infringe [plaintiff's] privacy rights is. . . an
insufficient basis for issuing a prior restraint." '15 Furthermore, in
In re King World Productions, Inc.," 6 the Sixth Circuit found that
the Title III injunctive remedy did not supersede the press's First
Amendment right to be free from prior restraints.1
Nonetheless, other courts have held that privacy interests may
justify a prior restraint. In Near v Minnesota,118 for example, the
Supreme Court enumerated certain "exceptional cases" that could
justify a prior restraint.1 9 Although the Court noted that it was
not concerned with "questions as to the extent of authority to pre-
vent publications in order to protect private rights according to the
principles governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of eq-
uity,"1 20 the Court favorably cited an article suggesting that equi-
table relief should be available to protect individual privacy
rights.'21
Additionally, in Commonwealth v Wiseman, 22 the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court held that an injunction was proper to prevent
the broadcast of a film showing psychiatric inmates in situations
that "would be degrading to a person of normal mentality and sen-
sitivity. 12' 3 The court found that broadcast of the tapes would con-
stitute a "massive, unrestrained invasion" of the patients' privacy
1986. Therefore, the Providence Journal court may not have considered the new provision
in its decision of the case, and may have reached a different conclusion had it considered the
new enactment.
"' 820 F2d at 1350.
116 898 F2d 56 (6th Cir 1990).
"' See id at 59:
Nothing in . . . [Title III] itself allows a complaint alleging a violation of [Title
III] or an actual violation of [Title III] to supersede the press's exercise of their
first amendment rights. While [Title III] proscribes certain conduct, it in no way
provides for a prior restraint of the press in their exercise of first amendment
rights even if the press's conduct clearly violates [Title III].
"8 283 US at 697.
"' Id at 716. The Near Court indicated three interests that would justify a prior re-
straint: (1) the publication of material crucial to national security, such as the sailing dates
of transports or the number and location of troops; (2) the enforcement of the "primary
requirements of decency" against obscene publications; and (3) the protection of the com-
munity against "incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly gov-
ernment." Id. This list is not exhaustive. See Nebraska Press, 427 US at 561 (holding that,
under certain circumstances, a violation of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
may justify a prior restraint).
11o Near, 283 US at 716.
I21 Id at 716 n 7, citing Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation And Inju-
ries To Personality, 29 Harv L Rev 640 (1916).
12' 356 Mass 251, 249 NE2d 610 (1969).
123 249 NE2d at 615.
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rights, and that the filmmaker had failed to obtain valid consent
releases from the patients as the Commonwealth required. 24
In Cullen v Grove Press, Inc.,125 however, the court found that
it could not restrain the broadcast of the exact same film at issue
in Wiseman without violating the First Amendment. The Cullen
court found that the condition of a psychiatric hospital was a mat-
ter of "legitimate public interest"12' and, relying on Time, Inc. v
Hill,27 concluded that it could not restrain the press from dissemi-
nating this information unless the movant showed that the film-
maker knew that the tape falsely depicted the condition of the
hospital or had acted in reckless disregard of the truth.'28 The
court denied injunctive relief because the movant failed to make
such a showing.
The conflict between Wiseman and Cullen bears strongly on
the questions at issue in Noriega. As in Cullen, CNN claimed that
the government's unlawful taping of Noriega's attorney-client con-
versations was a matter of public interest and was clearly authen-
tic. This suggests that Cullen should control, and that the court
could not protect Noriega's privacy rights through injunctive relief.
Nonetheless, unlike the condition of the psychiatric hospital at
issue in both Wiseman and Cullen, which could not have been ade-
quately conveyed without showing the film, CNN did not have to
air the Noriega tapes in order to inform the public of the govern-
ment's behavior. CNN could have instead aired a report stating
that it possessed government tapes of conversations between
Noriega and his attorney. Therefore, CNN could have facilitated
public debate about the government's behavior in Noriega without
broadcasting Noriega's attorney-client conversations. 29
Thus, restraining the broadcast of the tapes at issue in
Noriega does not involve "an injunction against the communica-
tion of ideas," but rather concerns the disclosure of unlawfully ob-
" Id at 615-16. More recently, Huskey v National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 632 F Supp
1282 (N D Ill 1986), held that injunctive relief may be available to prevent the broadcast of
videotapes that invade a prisoner's right to privacy where the tapes were made without the
prisoner's consent and where the broadcaster had both been informed that federal regula-
tions prohibit filming inmates without their consent and had contractually agreed to abide
by these regulations. Id at 1294-95.
125 276 F Supp 727 (S D NY 1967).
10 Id at 729.
385 US 374 (1967).
"s Cullen, 276 F Supp at 729.
" In fact, the Wiseman Court recognized that the condition of mental hospitals was a
matter of public concern, but found that public discussion of this issue did not require the
press to embarrass identifiable patients. 249 NE2d at 615-16.
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tained wiretaps, a "private wrong"' 30 for which Title III provides
injunctive relief. Because CNN knew that the tapes were recorded
unlawfully, an injunction preventing the broadcast of the tapes
would have been available under Title III and consistent with the
First Amendment.
C. The Adverse Incentives of Prior Restraints That Protect the
Privacy Rights of Criminal Defendants
Although prior restraints may be constitutionally justified
where they prevent the press from disseminating truthful informa-
tion that could violate a defendant's privacy rights, these restraints
raise troubling policy concerns. If courts issue prior restraints
before the press in fact makes the information public, the number
of privacy violations may actually increase, because such a rule
would create an incentive for the press to release the information
before the defendant learns that it exists.
For example, CNN did not have to take the Noriega tapes to
Rubino before broadcasting them. If CNN had known that Noriega
could obtain an injunction, it may have simply followed this course
and faced the possibility of damages under Title III. Freeing CNN
from the possibility of a prior restraint, in contrast, would give
CNN the opportunity to establish a dialogue with Noriega. This
dialogue would promote an exchange of information between the
defendant and the press and allow the defendant to explain how
disseminating the information may invade his privacy rights. This
in turn would allow the press to make an informed editorial deci-
sion as to whether to broadcast the information.
Although it may seem unfair to force the victim to wait for
publication before suing for damages,' this remedy is preferable
to a system that relies on the extraordinary remedy of prior re-
straints. The judicial system often relies on the editorial integrity
of the press to refrain from publishing highly prejudicial mate-
rial. -2 Although such self-enforcement will necessarily be imper-
"' See Huskey, 632 F Supp at 1294 (noting the distinction between these two types of
communications).
"' See id at 1296 ("It is no answer for NBC to tell Huskey to wait for a telecast and
then sue for damages.").
132 See Nebraska Press, 427 US at 560 ("The extraordinary protections afforded by the
First Amendment carry with them something in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise
the protected rights responsibly-a duty widely acknowledged but not always observed by
editors and publishers."); Providence Journal, 820 F2d at 1353 n 75 ("Although the Jour-
nal's actions are not in keeping with its long and distinguished history of responsible jour-
nalism they cannot form the basis for [punishment].").
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fect, it is preferable to a system that forces the press to quickly
decide whether to reveal that it possesses material that may violate
a defendant's privacy interests and run the risk of a prior restraint,
or to publish the material and run the risk of post-publication
sanctions.
Although CNN's decision to broadcast the Noriega tapes after
consulting with Noriega's attorney may have been an error in edi-
torial judgment, it is likely that CNN would have simply broadcast
the tapes if it had known that a prior restraint was available. Thus,
the "irreparable harm" that the restraint was intended to prevent
would have occurred. 8s While prior restraints may be necessary
under the narrow circumstances articulated in Nebraska Press to
protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, the legal system
should rely on the editorial discretion of the press to protect the
defendant's privacy interests.
CONCLUSION
This Comment concludes that Noriega was incorrectly de-
cided. The district court erred in two ways: first, it failed to make
the factual findings required by Nebraska Press that could have
been made without reviewing the tapes that CNN possessed, and
that would have established that the broadcast of the tapes would
not violate Noriega's right to a fair and impartial jury; and second,
the district court did not require Noriega to meet the proper bur-
den with regard to his right to be free from the disclosure of trial
strategy. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit erred in adopting the
Press-Enterprise test, which regulates the press's limited right of
access to court documents and proceedings, rather than the Ne-
ll' In some situations the press may not be able to disseminate all the information at
issue in a short period of time. See, for example, New York Times, 403 US at 759-60 (Black-
mun dissenting) (the Pentagon Papers comprised forty-seven volumes, and the New York
Times began to publish excerpts before the case began). In such a situation, a prior restraint
could prevent the continued dissemination of the prejudicial material.
This argument is inapposite for two reasons. First, it is unlikely that material prejudi-
cial to a criminal defendant's privacy rights will be so lengthy as to require dissemination
over an extended period of time. 'For example, while it would have taken CNN several days
to broadcast all the tapes in its possession, Noriega's privacy interests were violated as soon
as the first excerpt was published. Second, a prior restraint cannot minimize the damage to
privacy rights after the first dissemination of the material. If the press knows that the mo-
vant will be able to obtain a prior restraint after dissemination of a portion of a long docu-
ment or tape, the press will have an incentive to publish as much of that document or tape
as possible immediately. Moreover, the press will first publish that portion that is of the
greatest public interest. In most situations, this also will be the most prejudicial portion.
Thus, the availability of a prior restraint after limited dissemination of material creates the
same adverse incentives as the availability of a pre-publication restraint.
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braska Press test, which provides greater protection to the funda-
mental right to be free from prior restraints. Thus, the Supreme
Court should have granted certiorari and reversed.
Title III, however, could have justified a prior restraint in
Noriega. The government violated Title III when it recorded the
conversations between Noriega and his attorney, a violation of
which CNN had knowledge. Noriega, therefore, could have ob-
tained injunctive relief under Title III.
Nonetheless, imposing a prior restraint in this situation would
have caused more privacy violations than it would have prevented
because the availability of prior restraints encourages the press to
make potentially prejudicial information public before the criminal
defendant learns of its existence. Therefore, while prior restraints
may be appropriate to protect constitutional rights under limited
circumstances such as those defined in Nebraska Press, granting
prior restraints to prevent violations of privacy rights would actu-
ally encourage violations of these rights. The costs of this remedy
would therefore outweigh its benefits, making the adoption of such
a remedy an unwise development in First Amendment
jurisprudence.
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